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A FEW WORDS IN FAVOR OF CULTIVATING AN INCEST
TABOO IN THE WORKPLACE
Mary Anne Case*t
More than thirty years ago, in the April 1978 issue of Redbook
magazine, anthropologist Margaret Mead, after acknowledging the
contributions the passage and subsequent elaboration and enforcement of
the Equal Pay Act and Title VII had made to the progress of women in the
workplace, insisted that "new laws will not be sufficient to protect
women-and men too, for that matter-from the problems of sexual
harassment on the job ... . [W]e need new taboos[.]"' Specifically,
according to Mead, "like the family, the modem business and the modem
profession must develop incest taboos.' 2
In this abbreviated Essay, I want to endorse large parts of Mead's
proposal and to explain how it fits into my broader project of a unified field
theory of the treatment of liking and not liking in the law of employment
discrimination, a theory accounting for both sexual and nonsexual forms of
attraction between decision-makers in the workplace and those they have
the power to hire, fire, or promote.
Several features I see in the analogy to familial-incest taboos are
relevant to my endorsement of Mead's A Proposal. We Need Taboos on Sex
at Work. First, such taboos, while often embodied in law, do not rely
principally on legal enforcement but on internalized social norms for their
power. The reason that most parents do not initiate sexual relations with or
even lust after their children is by and large not because they would go to
jail if they were to do so. Moreover, a few may find that the very existence
of a taboo stimulates the forbidden desire, and some may think about it and
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1. Margaret Mead, A Proposal: We Need Taboos on Sex at Work, REDBOOK, Apr. 1978,
reprinted in SExuALrY AND ORGANIZATIONS: ROMANTIC AND COERCIVE BEHAVIORS AT WORK 54

(Dail Ann Neugarten & Jay M. Shafritz eds., 1980).
2. Id.
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feel revulsion at the thought, but I suspect that, for most parents, their
children simply are not thought of as in the category of potential sex
partners. In this sense, the thought of sex with one's children may be less
like the thought of consuming cockroaches (disgusting) or marijuana
roaches (potentially attractive, but forbidden) and more like the thought of
consuming hemp fiber-a thought that does not frequently occur because
hemp fiber is not generally thought of as comestible.
Second, no incest taboo that I know of categorically prohibits sex
between family members. (In most of the United States, for example, first
cousins are permitted to marry; in some parts of the world, first cousins are
preferred as spouses.) But at the core of most incest taboos, whatever else
they may also prohibit, is usually a prohibition on ancestor-descendant sex.
Similarly, what I would want to focus on discouraging in the workplace is
not any and all eroticism or search for sexual partners, but sex initiated
between people hierarchically arranged in a direct reporting relationship
with one another.
A third feature of how both Mead and I understand an incest taboo
relevant here is that we see one potentially valuable function of incest
taboos to be the creation of a safe space, free from sexual demand, threat, or
possibility. The space is not the geographical space of the home or the
workplace, it is the metaphysical space of a relationship, such as that
between parent and child or supervisor and supervisee.
I first endorsed the notion that it would be useful to think of sex in the
workplace in terms of an incest taboo in 1994, in a comment made at a
conference on the Centrality of Sexuality to Feminist Legal Theory,
sponsored by Martha Fineman's Feminism and Legal Theory Project. The
overwhelming majority of participants at that conference fell into one of two
groups: those who thought that sexuality was quite central to feminist legal
theory and that this was a good thing and those who worried that sexuality
was not yet as central as they thought it should be. I was in a tiny minority of
participants who expressed the view that sexuality was perhaps a bit too
central. Perhaps for this reason, my suggestion of an incest taboo in the
workplace was not at all well received. Some objectors took the view that
eroticism is central to our personalities; we spend so much time at work that we
have few places other than the workplace to express it; if we aren't allowed to
be freely erotic in the workplace we are basically condemned to a life of
celibacy and erotic repression. Others went on to say that eroticism was a vital
part of their particular work as teachers, that the teacher-student relationship
was necessarily and productively erotic, and that any interference with its
eroticism would be detrimental. I had responses to these objections, but the
vehemence of the objections delayed me for years in pursuing the project.
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Those intervening years brought scandals from Clinton-Lewinsky (in
which consensual sexual relations with an intern led to the impeachment of
the President) to the Aberdeen Proving Grounds (in which a dozen male
Army officers were prosecuted for sexual assault on female trainees under
their command), which strengthened my conviction that Mead's suggestion
was a good one. But the years also brought a series of cogently and
passionately argued defenses of sexual relationships between coworkers by
a number of distinguished academics from a variety of perspectives,
including Janet Halley's (portions of which were published as Sexuality
Harassment)3 and Vicki Schultz's (most fully elaborated in The Sanitized
Workplace),4 each of which must be dealt with if Mead's proposal is to gain
any traction.
Incest taboos at work have frequently been urged by others in the
interests of the good functioning of a given workplace, but my own focus is
more narrowly on discouraging those relationships that pose a risk of
limiting equality of opportunity in the workplace on grounds of sex. It is
also not my goal here to object to unequal power dynamics or hierarchical
imbalance in sexual relationships generally. Although I must confess that I
personally tend to be attracted to my equals, not my hierarchical superiors
or my subordinates, my argument for an incest taboo in the workplace
would leave room for sexual attraction and relationships between a highranking, powerful individual and those of lower rank, so long as the higherranking individual avoids initiating relationships with those lower down on
the same totem pole.
My focus in this discussion will not be on the relationship between the
perpetrator and either the direct victim of sexual harassment or the direct
beneficiary of a quid pro quo deal; it will instead be on the problems created
for other employees and for equal employment opportunity when a boss
engages in sexual relationships, whether or not welcome or fully
consensual, with subordinates in a workplace. In an as-yet-unpublished
portion of her work, Sexuality Harassment,5 Janet Halley calls this "thirdparty harassment" and is critical of policies, such as the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) Guidance on Employer Liability under
Title VII for Sexual Favoritism, 6 that would provide a remedy to a person
3. Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in DIRECTIONS INSEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 183,
189, 197-98 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004).
4. Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2164-67 (2003).
5. Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Other
portions of the work were published as Halley, supra note 3, and Janet Halley, Queer Theory by Men, in
FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY, supra note t (Martha Albertson Fineman, Jack E. Jackson &
Adam P. Romero eds., forthcoming 2009).
6.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

COMM'N,

POLICY GUIDANCE
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denied a job benefit that went to someone else in part because that person is
involved in sexual relations with a decision-maker in the workplace. One of
Halley's concerns, which I share, is that queer relationships between a boss
and a subordinate will be particularly vulnerable to hostile-environment
harassment complaints by other employees.
In contrast to Halley, however, I think there is much to be said in favor
of Title VII liability for some sexual favoritism. Let me use the example of
a workplace like the Clinton White House at the time of the Lewinsky affair
to illustrate why. It is clear all around that Monica Lewinsky herself had no
viable Title VII claim: she sought out and welcomed a relationship with her
boss and on balance seems to have suffered more employment benefit than
detriment. Although she felt herself banished from the White House, she
did step up from her unpaid internship to a paid job at the Pentagon, and
then received Vernon Jordan's help finding a private-sector job because of
her relationship with the President.7 But Clinton's interest in Monica
Lewinsky was far from unique.
With a boss like Clinton in charge of personnel decisions, women he
finds attractive could have special opportunities for advancement. In the
Clinton White House itself, however, Deputy Chief of Staff Evelyn
Lieberman apparently took it upon herself to shunt attractive women away
from Clinton, lest he hit on them. Under circumstances such as these, the
equal employment opportunities of both attractive and unattractive women
and men can be compromised on account of their sex, so it is hard to see
who the unaffected third parties are.
It may be worth noting that the EEOC's Sexual Favoritism guidelines
were first issued under the chairmanship of Clarence Thomas, someone
who may have known a thing or two about the effect of a supervisor's
manifesting sexual interest in a subordinate on employment opportunity in a
workplace. There are a few aspects of Title VII's treatment of sexual
favoritism on which it seems Clarence Thomas, the EEOC, Halley, the case
law, and I all agree, notably that:
Title VII does not prohibit isolated instances of preferential
treatment based upon consensual romantic relationships. An
isolated instance of favoritism toward a "paramour" (or a spouse,
or a friend) may be unfair, but it does not discriminate against

LLABILrrY UNDER TITLE VII FOR SEXUAL FAVORITIsM, EEOC Notice No. 915.048 (Jan. 12, 1990),

http://eeoc.gov/policy/docs/sexualfavor.htni [hereinafter EEOC GUIDANCE].
7. See, e.g., ANDREW MORTON, MONICA'S STORY 97, 168-71 (1999).

8. Id. at 93-95.
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women or men in violation of Title VII, since
both are
9
disadvantaged for reasons other than their genders.

While hiring an individual paramour may violate nepotism rules and may
be undesirable from the perspective of the good functioning of a particular
workplace, it is not sex discrimination because no one of any sex, other than
this particular person, could have gotten the job. Similarly, hiring those you
are close to in a nonsexual way may in a given workplace be undesirable
and violate nepotism rules, but it is not necessarily discrimination on a
forbidden ground.
If, however, you only hire your friends and you can only make
friends with other white Anglo-Saxon Protestant males, your hiring
decisions could well be found to violate Title VII. In the same way, if you
only hire people you are sexually attracted to and you are only sexually
attracted to men or women, or some subset of men or women, and they are
the people who are advantaged in your workplace, then you are making
use of a forbidden ground in your employment decisions. An
understanding of this led the EEOC, correctly in my view, to determine
that "Widespread Favoritism May Constitute Hostile Environment
Harassment" such that "both male and female colleagues who do not
welcome this conduct can establish a hostile work environment in
violation of Title VII regardless of whether any objectionable conduct is
directed at them and regardless of whether those who were granted
favorable treatment willingly bestowed the sexual favors."' 10
Vicki Schultz insists:
[I]t is important to recognize that the problem of favoritism is not
confined to dating and sexual relationships. After all, supervisors
may also develop intimate attachments of a nonsexual nature that
predispose them to favor particular employees over others. As
women have long complained, playing golf regularly with the
(heterosexual male) boss can lead to sex-based patterns of
favoritism for men who do so. ... [T]he problems of favoritism
and/or coercion cannot be solved by discouraging dating and
sexual intimacy alone. I
I quite agree with this analysis, and with Schultz's conclusion that
"organizations that discourage romantic relationships would also have to
9. EEOC GuIDANCE, supranote 6.
10. Id.
11.

Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY, supra

note 5.
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consider the potential for discriminatory dynamics to develop in
connection with nonsexual
forms of affiliation that can affect a worker's
'2
prospects."'
employment
If organizations were indeed prompted to treat sexual and nonsexual
affiliation between supervisors and subordinates in pari materia, Schultz
seems to hope the result would be fewer categorical prohibitions on sexual
relationships between coworkers. My hopes tend in a somewhat different
direction, toward encouraging greater scrutiny of the forbidden grounds that
may lurk beneath a boss's preferring those he is comfortable with or
attracted to, whether sexually or not. In the landmark case of Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the United States Supreme Court was able to see
that "if an employee's flawed 'interpersonal skills' can be corrected by a
soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the employee's sex
and not her interpersonal skills that has drawn the criticism."' 3 But, more
recently, courts such as the Second Circuit in Fisher v. Vassar College
seem more willing to accept at face value, as a justifiable basis for an
adverse employment decision, the fact that decision-makers in the
workplace "simply did not like [the plaintiff] and did not wish to establish a
career-long professional association with her,"' 14 without as careful attention
to the extent to which forbidden grounds were a factor in the decisionmakers' dislike.
My objective is not to ban all warm feelings from the workplace. But I
have noticed that, even where a supervisor links sexual interest in
subordinates with a genuine mentoring opportunity that can survive a
refusal of, or an eventual end to, the sex, too often the supervisor who offers
special mentorship to "the boys" he pals around with and "the girls" he
sleeps with leaves out those women who are never offered an opportunity to
be either one of the boys or the object of his sexual interest. Those who
divide their circle into "bros" and "hos," even if they don't put bros before
hos, tend to leave out the women who are neither. (If all men can be
brothers, are all women whores?)
I note with interest that, from time immemorial, some workplaces did
indeed have prohibitions on a supervisor having too close a relationship,
whether or not sexual, with a subordinate, although equal employment
opportunity was not the announced purpose of most such prohibitions.
Beyond a garden-variety employer's antinepotism and anticronyism
policies, what attracts my interest are rules designed for two special kinds
12. Id.
13. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 256 (1989) (other portions of the plurality
opinion superceded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 107).
14. Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420, 1436 (2d Cir. 1995).
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of workplace-the Catholic Church's ban on particular friendships and the
military's antifraternization policies. The notion behind the ban on
particular friendships is that, in an extremely close working environment
such as a monastery, relations between coworkers, and especially between a
superior and each of his subordinates in the community, should, for want of
a better word, be equidistant. If the abbot and one of the other monks were
really close, whether sexually or not, the Church feared an adverse effect on
the dynamic of the whole community. In more recent times, criticism of
particular friendships has come into bad odor because it is associated with a
Catholic repudiation of sex and potential obsession with homosexual
sodomy. It is important to note, however, that the traditional ban was not
simply on sexual or romantic relationships, but extended equally to sexual
and nonsexual forms of friendship.
Similarly, military bans on fraternization in the ranks, designed to
promote good order and discipline and to avoid the appearance of partiality,
have always extended far beyond sexual and romantic relationships to
other forms of close friendships and business dealings. 15 Although
"fraternization" is too often used today as a mere synonym for prohibited
sexual interactions, the military prohibited officers from fraternizing with
enlisted personnel long before there were women in the armed forces or
widespread expressions of concern about homosexuality in the military.
Military antifraternization rules were concerned not only with officers
having sex with subordinates but also with officers gambling or carousing
or going into business with subordinates.
Schultz worries that taboos on workplace sex lead male supervisors to
be unwilling to go behind closed doors or on business trips with (attractive)
female coworkers.' 6 Like Mead, I would argue, by contrast, that it is
precisely in the absence of an effective taboo that we worry about leaving
men unsupervised with women or adults unsupervised with children.
Is there a solution to this problem that is not as sex-negative as mine or
Mead's, that doesn't repress eroticism or embrace even temporary celibacy?
Perhaps because I define myself as a sameness feminist, opposed in
principle to categorical sex distinctions in the way men and women are
treated, I find myself drawn back to Richard Wasserstrom's early essay
analogizing race and sex discrimination, in which he provocatively suggests
15. See 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2000) (article of the Uniform Code of Military Justice under which
fraternization is prosecuted); accord MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES pt. IV,
60.a,
83.c; id. app. 23, 83 (2008) (enumerating "Fraternization" as a punishable military offense and
explaining that "the offense of fraternization is based on longstanding custom ... [as] prejudicial to
good order and discipline").
16. Schultz, supranote 11.

HeinOnline -- 33 Vt. L. Rev. 557 2008-2009

Vermont Law Review

[Vol. 33:551

that perhaps there will always be sex discrimination and therefore inequality
of opportunity on grounds of sex until we are all perfectly bisexual.' 7 This
paradoxically makes the bisexual harasser, who was the bogeyman of early
sexual-harassment cases, as much a solution as a problem. In a world of
perfect bisexuality, where both friendship and sexual interest were on offer,
if not to everyone indiscriminately then at least not on the basis of the
forbidden ground of one's sex, even widespread favoritism, sexual or not,
might not raise Title VII sex-discrimination concerns, and my own reasons
for cultivating an incest taboo in the workplace might vanish, although not
those reasons typically addressed by antifraternization or antinepotism
rules. I realize, however, that it will be hard enough to develop an incest
taboo in the workplace. To develop perfect bisexuality among all the people
who might enter into it is not necessarily undesirable, but is an even less
attainable goal.

17. Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and PreferentialTreatment: An Approach to the
Topics, 24 UCLA L. REv. 581, 606 (1977).
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